Nuclear Industry

Back in the late 1950's, ideas for the use of small nuclear reactors for various purposes were in vogue. During that period, when I worked for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, I heard speculation over the possible use of atomic energy to run our autos, heat our houses, lift our rockets to the heavens. Many of these ideas were so wild, they were quickly dropped. However, some small reactors were designed and used for university research projects, medical and industrial isotope production and even nuclear submarine propulsion. 

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WATER, ROCKS AND NUCLEAR WASTE


HOORAY! We hit water, and lots of it!  At two hundred forty feet the pinkish gray granite rock gave way to a reddish color and at two hundred and eighty feet our well "came in." Water was being pumped from the hole at the rate of forty gallons per minute, and had leveled off at a depth of sixteen feet from the surface.  Our eastern Manitoba household would have plenty of clean, cold water.

Could there be a veritable labyrinth of rivers and streams underground, running cold and deep, through the ancient Pre-Cambrian rock of the Canadian Shield?  The strangest thought of all was that we had tampered with some of the deep secrets of the world below us. Nature was permanently altered and had given to us one of her most valued treasures. For that we were thankful.

While we were well drilling on our property, Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., (AECL), at its nearby nuclear research station, was conducting test drilling as a prelude for an underground nuclear waste research laboratory (URL) in our municipality. It’s officials initially insisted that the granite rock formation in the area had “remarkably few cracks.”  However, during the major excavation of the URL during the early 1980's, an extensive water-bearing fracture zone was encountered.  Several cracks, including a large fracture resulted in the intake of considerable amounts of ground water. requiring pumps to run continuously.

Probably the most descriptive statement about the wet condition of the URL came from Walter Patterson, when he spoke at a 1986 nuclear waste conference in Winnipeg.  Trained in nuclear physics and residing in the UK, he was involved with many aspects of nuclear technology for decades. He visited the URL underground facility in as an advisor to a Select Environmental Committee of the British Parliament. After the visit, the Parliamentarians asked his opinion of the operation. Patterson told the conferees, that for the first time on the entire Canadian trip, "I had to say I had not the faintest idea.. I do not know why they are doing what they are doing: because if this is supposed to be research for an underground repository for final disposal of spent fuel, everybody in the business knows that the one thing you have to avoid is water -- and the place is soaking! Absolutely soaking! Up to here (gesturing) in water!"

My comment to reporters after I visited the URL excavation was “if you plan to go down into that hole, be sure to take your rain boots, an umbrella and a life raft.  When you think about nuclear waste going into that wet hole, it gives you the chills.”  

Over the ensuing years, our own personal well drilling experience in 1980 has always been in the back of my mind whenever the subject of deep underground “disposal” of irradiated fuel waste comes up.  Common sense informs us that ground water can eventually corrode waste canisters and carry lethal radioactive substances into the environment above. Given the toxic nature and longevity of the irradiated fuel wastes created by the operation of nuclear reactors, few would disagree that the presence of groundwater presents a serious problem for the integrity of an underground nuclear waste repository.  

And, what about these lethal substances?  

According to Wikipedia, “Certain radioactive elements (such as plutonium-239) in ‘spent’ fuel will remain hazardous to humans and other living beings for hundreds of thousands of years. Other radioisotopes remain hazardous for millions of years. Thus, these wastes must be shielded for centuries and isolated from the living environment for millennia. Some elements, such as Iodine-131, have a short half-life (around 8 days in this case) and thus they will cease to be a problem much more quickly than other, longer-lived, decay products but their activity is much greater initially.”   

Hundreds of thousands and millions of years?  It may be easier to wrap your mind around the concept of a billion or trillion dollars!

In the U.S., Yucca Mountain, Nevada was chosen as the preferred site for an irradiated nuclear fuel waste repository.

One of the reasons the Nevada location was originally selected was because of its arid, desert location.  Yucca Mountain (geologically, a tuff formation) would be nice and dry.  Or so it was thought.

The October 15, 1994 issue of the Las Vegas Sun, reported that “. . Radioactive water from past nuclear testing has penetrated to layers below the proposed storage site. Scientists studying Yucca Mountain as a place to store the nation's high-level nuclear waste have found evidence that surface water from the days of atmospheric nuclear testing probably seeped to layers beneath the proposed repository site,”  The Department of Energy spokesman, Greg Cook was reported as saying ". . . the finding is obviously of concern to us because ground water intrusion within the repository would make it more difficult to contain for 10,000 years the 77,000 tons of spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors that the government wants to entomb there."

Carl Johnson, a geologist for the State of Nevada Nuclear Projects Agency, which monitors the federal Yucca Mountain studies, said that ". . . the finding means 'at least one very fast pathway' exists for ground water to move from the surface to below the repository site." Johnson said that ". . . samples collected from a bore hole on the southeast side of the repository site, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, contained tritium and chlorine-36 isotopes, residuals from nuclear weapons testing. That means the water seeped from the surface to a depth of 1,450 feet within the 49 years since the first US nuclear weapons test was conducted in New Mexico and probably since nuclear testing began in Nevada in 1951."

Over the years, billions of dollars have been poured into the Yucca Mountain Project.  In 2009 it experienced major cuts to its budget at the hands of the Obama Administration.  It’s future as a nuclear waste repository lies in doubt.

The latest Canadian proclamation about the suitability of an underground repository (this one for low and intermediate level radioactive waste) comes from Ontario Power Generation (OPG).  Its plan is for a deep geological repository (DGR) at the Bruce nuclear facility near the shore of Lake Huron.  

In media reports, OPG has stated that "There is a consensus in our research that shows the natural barriers will help protect the repository," and that "The limestone bedrock formations that are there have an extremely low rate of permeability. Also, there is a cap of shale 200 meters (about 656 feet) above the repository area that would act as a protective layer."  

That rhetoric is an echo of earlier optimistic  “dry rock” expectations.  What will they find in the limestone excavation?  Based on the URL (granite) experience, and the Yucca Mountain (tuff) one, can we anticipate water logged caverns feeding into Lake Huron?   

But the biggest question of all is what will the industry-dominated Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) turn up in its ongoing search for a willing community to “host” a repository for Canada’s irradiated nuclear fuel waste?  Even if some community in Canada does volunteer for the “undertaking,” any water found within its underground natural barriers would still be a major deterrent.

“Water, water, everywhere.” It’s been nearly 30 years since the Underground Research Laboratory was excavated and over 20 years since the Yucca Mountain project was started.  The time has come to look for other methods  to manage irradiated nuclear fuel waste.  In the absence of an acceptable solution, the most rational and logical first step is to phase out its production.

Walter Robbins
September, 2009











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NUCLEAR EXPANSION: THE ROAD TO OBLIVION?

Like the tobacco companies of yore, the nuclear establishment is currently aggressively marketing its dubious products. Most recently, the industry has been bombarding the public with ads to the effect that nuclear energy is clean, safe and environmentally friendly; depicting it as an important tool in dealing with climate change and global warming. Nothing could be further from the truth.

This paper summarizes the downside of expanding nuclear power, which requires processes which cause noxious emissions as well as highly irradiated toxic fuel waste, uses non-renewable and ever more costly uranium deposits with increasing amounts of energy inputs, emits radioactive tritium into the air and water, contributes greatly to the Canadian national debt, is the basis for nuclear weapons proliferation, and is a desirable target for terrorism. It is a technology that must have an impossible-to-achieve perfect record of zero tolerance for serious accidents over an entire reactor life cycle, as there is no safe level of ionizing radiation.

Yes, nuclear energy does boil water which is converted to electricity, that is when not in a shut- down state for frequent maintenance. Yes, there are much safer, cheaper and environmentally friendly alternatives. Yes, our politicians are idiots if they pursue the nuclear option.

Please feel free to use this commentary and the material below to help prevent nuclear expansion and to promote nuclear phase-out along with a rapid increase in safe renewable energy alternatives, conservation and efficiency.

Walt Robbins

March, 2007 

 

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Preface

Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., it was widely reported that al-Qaeda had given serious consideration to crashing commercial aircraft into several nuclear plants on that day. According to journalist Jeffrey St. Clair, in his September 14, 2002 Counterpunch article (The Fire Next Time), al-Qaeda operatives Ramzi bin al-Shaibah and Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammad told Al-Jazeera interviewer Yosri Fouda, that future attacks on western nuclear facilities could not be ruled out.

While it is true that nuclear reactors are housed in buildings that are among the most durable modern structures in existence, and have been designed to (hopefully) withstand the force of earthquakes, no one had ever conceived of a direct impact from a large commercial aircraft full of aviation fuel or from some other similar massive explosive assault. Some authorities state that the consequences would be truly catastrophic.

But the real Achilles heels at nuclear plants are the adjacent spent fuel facilities, which contain major concentrations of highly radioactive material. They lack the heavy duty containment safeguard provided for the reactor, and could be considered "sitting ducks" for disastrous terror attacks. Large explosions, along with major fire resulting in radioactive release from spent fuel would have serious health, social and economic consequences for people in the surrounding geographical area. It should be noted that many of our nuclear facilities are in close proximity to the Great Lakes. Any ecological disaster resulting from terrorism could affect both Canada and the United States.
Unfortunately, none of the discussion papers commissioned by the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) deals forthrightly and directly with the need to "harden" existing spent fuel facilities at reactor-sites to better protect them from such an attack.
Some of the discussion papers deal with nuclear waste security, but in rather general and overly reassuring terms. These discussion papers are available to the public from the NWMO.

The references to pertinent discussion papers follow my commentary:

Commentary on the discussion documents dealing with the security of nuclear waste:
In my view, the NWMO discussion papers (with the exception of the final one by Ed Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists), do not truly come to grips with the growing threat of extremist Islamic terrorism in the world, and how spent nuclear fuel could be used to further that threat. Perhaps one reason for this is that Canada, unlike many other countries, has, thankfully, not yet been subjected to these barbaric attacks. Another possibility is that Canadian authorities are actually working on the problem, but prefer to keep their efforts quiet----for security reasons.

In any event, none of these papers directly identify, in any degree of detail, possible kinds of terrorist scenarios and how Canada could develop plans to deal with them. Mostly, the papers hide behind administrative requirements and regulations of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, almost as if somehow the rule book itself provides a wall of protection.

1 Transportation of spent nuclear fuel:
Several discussion papers emphasize that there have been no attacks on spent fuel shipments anywhere in the world. But, some also point out that there have been relatively few spent fuel shipments. If spent fuel is to be moved from reactor sites to any centralized locations, shipment frequency would increase dramatically over decades. It is hard to imagine that such a change would escape the notice of terrorists who are becoming increasingly sophisticated with their information networks and their technology for destructive acts. Lauding past performance is not a comforting response to the potential threats of the future.
Assertions to the effect that attacks upon spent fuel shipments would fail, or produce very limited negative consequences, or that safeguards in the present security system are adequate, minimize the fact of the rapid advance of destructive technologies now in use or potentially available to those who wish to do us harm. And, as Mr. Bin Laden has indicated, all of us who are not in his camp, can be considered "infidels" and fair game.

Are contemporary spent fuel transportation casks on trucks or trains sufficiently "robust" to withstand a major, high yield type of attack? Many nuclear watchdog groups and others, point out that governments have not undertaken the kinds of full scale tests required, and therefore, the question cannot be reliably answered.

As one paper points out, other transported substances might be more easily used by terrorists. Perhaps, but that overlooks the essence of the terrorist mentality and objectives; i.e., to terrorize the public. The large scale psychological impact on the public from damage or destruction of a radioactive nuclear source (as contrasted with any other substance) should never be underestimated.
Any contemplated large-scale, long-time period movement of spent nuclear fuel from reactor sites to some centralized storage or repository site, is, for me, truly a "non-starter." Furthermore, I am fully confident that communities along nuclear waste transportation routes would veto any such plan.

2 Security of the storage options themselves:

In spite of the reassuring words about security of the various options in some of the above cited discussion papers, no concrete evidence has been presented that any one of the nuclear waste management options is really secure from large scale terrorist attacks. The onus has been placed upon current regulatory standards which were produced for a bygone age. Nowhere (with the exception of Ed Lyman's paper) have some of the key technical issues surrounding terrorism even been identified. Nowhere in these papers has the central issue of the need for securing and "hardening" on-reactor-site storage facilities against contemporary terrorist methodology, been addressed.
As long as the reactors are operating, there will always be about a ten year (cooling off) inventory of high-level nuclear waste at the reactor sites, even if the older waste is moved somewhere else. The technical problems surrounding the security of that on-site waste must be addressed. That they have not been adequately addressed in the NWMO discussion papers dealing with the subject of security, is a very serious deficiency; one which would make any attempt at the selection of a final nuclear waste management option, a dubious exercise at best.

Outside of a general recognition of need, specific security problems and protections for the centralized (above or below ground) storage option were not mentioned. Both a centralized storage facility and an underground repository facility share some of the same security risks; i.e., transportation to them, as well as vulnerability of protracted surface exposure at the destination, including loading and unloading, repackaging, and movement to the final resting place.

Advocates of "permanent" underground burial in a deep geological repository have long insisted that their option is virtually completely secure; from theft, terrorism, accidents, etc. As indicated above, the permanent burial option is still subject to the security risks of transportation and the exposed surface destination. Nor does burial solve the problem of the "hot" waste that must remain at the reactor sites for a decade before being moved.

Can geological repositories really remain secure for thousands, or even hundreds of years? Some scientists think not and suggest that such facilities could become "plutonium mines" of the future.

An underlying premise of the burial concept is that the waste would not only become irretrievable, but the waste repositories themselves, would require "no institutional controls." Given the advance of science and technology, there is absolutely no reason to believe that a sealed-up underground facility would need any fewer institutional controls than an aboveground one. It would be prudent to assume that those in the future who might want to extract the contents of an underground nuclear burial place, will have the capabilities to do so with whatever technologies, and for whatever purposes they may then have.

In any event, by now it should be crystal clear that this "out-of-sight-out-of-mind" approach was not embraced by a public which was confronted with the spectre of permanent geological burial. Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., (AECL) discovered this in the 1980's while trying to implement such a program in the Canadian Shield rock in Manitoba and Ontario. More recently, media accounts of an NWMO commissioned study (Citizens' Dialogue on the Long-term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, July, 2004) reported that "Canadians want the radioactive waste from their nuclear reactors stored within reach, not dropped down holes deep into the rocky Precambrian Shield and forgotten. And they don't trust government, industry or existing regulators with the job."

In the U.S., the Commission which studied the circumstances that led up to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, pointed to a "lack of imagination" on the part of the intelligence community.

 I note a singular lack of imagination in most of the Canadian NWMO discussion papers that deal with the subject of security and nuclear waste. There is an unmistakable aura of smugness and complacency in some of these writings which I find disquieting.
They convey the message "Don't worry, we have it all under control." Anytime I hear that kind of message on a subject of this gravity--I do indeed worry. And so should we all!

Pertinent Discussion Papers

One discussion paper, numbered 3-3, is under the category, Health and Safety, and entitled the Status of Canadian and International Efforts to Reduce the Security Risk of Nuclear Fuel Waste, (by Science Applications International Corporation).

It is an overview of current security requirements and applications to future management possibilities and includes basic information about how nuclear waste is currently generated and how it is managed in Canada and internationally. It assesses the nature and extent of potential threats against nuclear waste and provides a section on current security measures including a "risk management approach." It also summarizes Canadian and international security requirements, as well as application of existing security regulations in the context of storage, disposal, reprocessing and transportation.
One of its main conclusions is that current storage management as well as future management options meet Canadian and International requirements; that there have been no "credible threats" to the fuel waste and that the present system acts as a deterrent to "...the current crop of potential terrorists."

Several other NWMO discussion papers deal with security of spent fuel transportation:

Number 6.8, under the Technical Methods category is called Review of the fundamental issues and key considerations related to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, by Gavin J. Carter of Butterfield Carter and Associates, L.L.C.
In its Section 8 (Security Requirements) this paper concludes that transportation of spent fuel "can be managed safely" and is a "low risk activity."

It notes that illegal procurement or attacks on a shipment of spent fuel has never occurred anywhere in the world. International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA) in 1972 first published guidelines for physical protection, used by governments in member countries. Its most recent document is INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. (1980) which requires specific arrangements and meeting of defined standards of physical protection for movements of nuclear material.

The paper notes the existing use of armed guards in certain transport situations e.g., plutonium, (or spent fuel through heavy populated areas in some countries).
Some of its main conclusions are that hazardous material is not an appealing target for thieves as it is difficult to handle, and of little financial or practical value; that spent fuel casks are "... too unwieldy to move quickly", etc. ( difficult for someone to steal or to use for a "dirty bomb"). It notes that "...shipments of spent fuel take place relatively infrequently. As for a terrorist attack, the paper asserts that "A large explosive charge would be necessary to breach the containment of the cask. Even if this is achieved, a dangerous disbursement of radioactive materials will not necessarily occur." The section on security concludes with the statement that "... there are many substances being transported much more frequently every day that would be more attractive options for terrorists than spent fuel casks."

Discussion Paper Number 6-6, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Transportation Systems of High-level Radioactive Waste Management, by Wardrop Engineering, Inc.

This paper reviews the status of plans for transport of used fuel in various countries and deals with possible methods of transportation to a centralized storage or underground repository facility in Canada.
This paper observes that "...though large-scale shipments of used fuel are not currently conducted in Canada, it is a distinct possibility in the future."

In its section 6.10, "Transportation Security Plans," it provides a general statement of Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) license and threat assessment requirements. It does identify some of the measures that might be required for security, such as armed guards, escort personnel, and response forces.
In addition to security of transportation issues, several other papers review security aspects of some of the management options themselves.

Discussion Paper 6-1, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Reactor Site Storage Systems For Used Nuclear Fuel, by Senes Consultants Limited

Primarily, this paper reviews methods and plans for on-site nuclear waste storage throughout Canada. Some tangential issues are covered, including Security (in section 3.3).

As is the case with some of the other papers dealing with security issues, it mainly addresses the basic CNSC regulatory framework with a general description of the procedures that must be followed for the security of spent nuclear fuel. Although it does not address the need for further securing or "hardening" of on-site storage against high-impact terrorist threats, it does recognize public concern. It states that during NWMO workshops and discussion groups, in the wake of September 11, 2001, participant comments "...reflected concerns about the security of fuel currently stored at the reactor sites."

Paper 6-3, under the Technical Methods category is titled Status of Geological repositories for Used Nuclear Fuel, by Charles McCombie, McCombie Consulting

This paper provides an overview and assessment of the international status and developments of the underground "disposal" (burial) option for the long-term management of nuclear waste. Much of the paper relates to the safety of this option.
The issue of security as related to the underground burial option (section 4.3) is presented in general terms making the point that "...ensuring that there can be no unauthorised access to these materials, is vital throughout the whole fuel cycle." The paper maintains that security would be enhanced by the implementation of geological repositories, and suggests a global system of a fewer number of such facilities. There is, however, recognition of the larger transportation problems resulting from such a system.

Discussion Paper 6-2, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Centralized Storage Systems for Used Nuclear Fuel, by Mohan Rao and Dave Hardy of Hardy Stevenson and Associates Limited.

In its examination of the centralized storage option, this paper lacks a specific section on the security issue. It does state that since centralized storage systems could have a long lifetime, they should "...include appropriate features that address security and safeguards issues such as proliferation and terrorism by limiting possibilities through which such acts could be carried out."

Two additional NWMO papers deal specifically with the security issue:

Discussion paper 1-4 Guiding Concepts: Nuclear Waste Management in Canada: The Security Dimension, by Franklyn Griffiths, Ignatieff Chair Emeritus of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto

This paper deals directly with the security aspects of nuclear waste management.
It develops the idea of a dichotomy between centralized national security needs on the one hand, and the need to address individual human security needs on the other. So any national security perspective would need to be "enlarged" to involve the public as a whole in discussions. Griffiths maintains that the two perspectives are not entirely compatible when applied to options for nuclear waste management.

He concludes that the NWMO has an opportunity to "make a human security effort to gain support for an agreed approach." Failing that, the Canadian public might embrace the idea of a continued on-site storage option and join in international efforts to explore other alternatives, (.e.g., one or more international repositories, transmutation of long-lived radionuclides).
He also considers that an integrated approach between national and human security could be attempted.

One other paper on security (unnumbered) was provided by the NWMO, titled Comments on "Nuclear Waste Management in Canada: The Security Dimension," by Prof. Franklyn Griffiths." The author of these comments is Edwin S. Lyman, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, D.C.

In his comments on Professor Griffith's paper, Edwin Lyman takes a more narrowly focussed approach to Nuclear Waste security than does Griffith. Lyman considers that the details of the "purely technical aspects" of this issue are more complex than Griffith suggests, and that an understanding of them is fundamental to any nuclear waste management program. Lyman outlines the key technical issues which must be faced and are not being addressed. He is highly critical of the U.S. government's apathetic response to public concerns over nuclear waste security subsequent to the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

He is concerned that the nuclear industry may not be willing to underwrite the large costs of providing the required high level of security needed for public safety. If that is the case in Canada, he suggests a Canadian public dialogue on questions surrounding the future of nuclear power plants and spent fuel production in the face of increasing terrorist threats.

READ:  The Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga:  http://www.web.net/~robbins

 Nuclear Industry still hell-bent on deep underground burial of irradiated fuel

 You have got to hand it to the Canadian Nuclear Industry. It doesn't give up easily. Having failed to gain access to a site for a permanent underground nuclear waste dump in the late 1970's and early 80's, it is getting ready to take another kick at the can using its very own Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) as its agent. Presented as a gift to the nuclear industry by the fiercely pro-nuclear Government of Canada , NWMO was created in 2002 under the Federal Nuclear Waste Act. After massaging the issue for the past three years, in its draft final report, Choosing the Way Forward, the NWMO concluded that the growing stockpiles of irradiated nuclear fuel from Canada's reactors should ultimately wind up in a deep rock underground tomb. What a surprise!

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No More Nukes
                    
February 10, 2006

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Radiation Routes

As I sit here in my home office on the west side of the city of Kingston, Ontario, I can hear the sounds of passing freight trains on one of the main Canadian east-west rail corridors. At this point, the trains pass close to the spot where the St. Lawrence River Seaway widens into Lake Ontario. When all is quiet late at night, I can sometimes hear the faint sounds of the big trucks roaring along the only major east-west four lane highway across eastern Ontario; "the 401." On rare occasions, I can even hear the low, resonant sounds of a ship's horn on the seaway.

If the nuclear industry gets its way, some day soon, highly radioactive and toxic nuclear wastes from reactors in the provinces of Québec and New Brunswick could move along on this and other transportation corridors, heading west toward a yet to be designated central storage or repository site. West, because it is very unlikely that such a central facility would ever be constructed in any of the provinces to the east of Ontario, the province which produces most of Canada's nuclear reactor waste.

These shipments will be continuous and over many years, possibly decades.

With the exception of permanent on-reactor-site-storage of spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel, the legislative options under review by the nuclear industry's Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO), must involve the use of these major Canadian transportation corridors; possibly a combination of all three: rail, road and water

The heavy casks could not likely be transported by air for some obvious reasons, not the least of which would be the risk of a high impact crash in a populated area, resulting in explosions, fire, and widespread dispersion of the radioactive cancer-causing agents in nuclear waste.

However, past experience suggests that one should never underestimate the willingness (as well as the arrogance) of the nuclear industry to expose Canadians to the risks of air transport of nuclear waste as it did in the year 2000. Although our Campaign STOP (Stop Trafficking of Plutonium) did help prevent test shipments of mixed plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel from the U.S. and Russia from crossing the 1000 Island Bridge near Kingston, Ontario, it was finally flown right over the heads of many of us. The MOX story is chronicled in the 2004 update of The Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga on this web site.

As I indicated in my previous commentary on nuclear waste and terrorism, some of the NWMO commissioned discussion papers deal with nuclear waste security in rather general and overly reassuring terms. None of these papers directly identify, in any degree of detail, possible kinds of terrorist scenarios and how Canada could develop plans to deal with them. Mostly, the papers cite administrative requirements and regulations of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, almost as if the rule book itself will provide a wall of protection.

Most of the NWMO information relating to transportation can be found in the following documents, all of which chant the nuclear industry "low risk" mantra:

Discussion Paper Number 6-8 is called Review of the fundamental issues and key considerations related to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, by Gavin J. Carter of Butterfield Carter and Associates, L.L.C. This paper concludes that "There are a number of extensive technical papers that support the conclusion that spent fuel transport is a low risk activity."

Discussion Paper Number 6-6 is titled Status of Transportation Systems of High-level Radioactive Waste Management, by Wardrop Engineering, Inc. This paper declares that "...because of the rugged design of the licensed transportation casks in Canada, it is unlikely that an accident would result in a serious release of radioactive material."

Discussion Paper Number 6-7 is called Status of Storage, Disposal and Transportation Containers for the Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, by Aamir Husain and Kwansik Choi, Kinectrics, Inc. This paper emphasizes the "rigorous requirements" that must be met by the transportation containers.

Not everyone agrees with the rosy risk and consequence assessments outlined in the NWMO discussion papers on nuclear waste transportation. The NWMO, as an integral part of the nuclear industry, appears to have limited its consulting contracts on this issue to firms which are well versed in "nuke-speak." One could legitimately ask, where are the papers from those who might take a different view of the issue of nuclear waste transportation safety?

Internet search reveals that some very serious questions about the safety, security as well as social and economic aspects of transporting irradiated nuclear fuel do indeed exist! Some of the issues they highlight are as follows:

. Property value losses along the transportation corridor
. Routine radiation exposure during handling and transit
. Worst Case Scenario radiation exposure, health and environmental costs
. Likelihood of increased transportation accidents resulting from greater shipment frequency and duration.
. Need for full-scale testing of shipping cask ability to withstand such extreme events as very high temperature fire, major collisions involving other dangerous goods, or massive terrorist attack from truck bombs or aircraft.

To move nuclear waste on a large-scale basis, in my opinion, would be an irrational act. In the event that such a program is undertaken, it must involve considerable consultation and input from all the communities affected along the selected transportation corridors.

The policy statement of the Nuclear Waste Watch, ( a network of thirty environmental, social and other groups across Canada) states that "the potential recipient and transport route communities should all have veto power, and should receive funding from proponents for independent research and community education." In my view, such veto power must be absolute and non-negotiable.

But let us hope that cooler heads prevail and affected communities will not be subjected to the concerns and anxiety over continuous shipments of nuclear waste; that the waste will remain in its present locations, hardened against terrorist attacks, that Canada will join in the ongoing international research efforts to render the waste inert and harmless through such processes as accelerator transmutation.

The truth of the matter is, that there is no solution to the problem of nuclear waste at this time, and until there is, it would be the height of folly to commit to a long-term, mass transportation program of the kind discussed in the nuclear industry (NWMO) discussion papers.

http://www.web.net/~robbins

 Nuclear Industry still hell-bent on deep underground burial of irradiated fuel

 You have got to hand it to the Canadian Nuclear Industry. It doesn't give up easily. Having failed to gain access to a site for a permanent underground nuclear waste dump in the late 1970's and early 80's, it is getting ready to take another kick at the can using its very own Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) as its agent. Presented as a gift to the nuclear industry by the fiercely pro-nuclear Government of Canada , NWMO was created in 2002 under the Federal Nuclear Waste Act. After massaging the issue for the past three years, in its draft final report, Choosing the Way Forward, the NWMO concluded that the growing stockpiles of irradiated nuclear fuel from Canada's reactors should ultimately wind up in a deep rock underground tomb. What a surprise!

NWMO has taken us right back to the late 1970's. There appear to be only two significant changes in the NWMO report as compared with the earlier effort spearheaded by Federal Crown Corporation, Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.(AECL). The first is an expansion of the kinds of geological rock formations deemed suitable for the dump. AECL initially restricted its dump site search and research to special "plutonic" granite formations. Much scientific hoopla was touted for this choice. But, later, after disrupting many communities in the Canadian Shield in its pluton search effort, AECL announced that a dump could go into any type of granite rock formation. Now the NWMO has gone a step further by including so-called "Ordovician Sedimentary" rock, which can be found in many parts of Canada, including Ottawa, Kingston, and the Bruce Peninsula in Ontario. Such locations are now considered suitable candidates for potential nuclear waste dumps. Such an expansion of potential sites would vastly increase the chances of NWMO finding some needy community willing to sell its soul and its safety to the nuclear industry for big bucks. Seems that science has taken a back seat to the industry which desperately needs to appear to have solved the nuclear waste problem. The new motto should be "Any old rock will do -- just let us in!"

The other change is the establishment of a longer time line for the upcoming effort. NWMO's time frame could extend as far as three hundred years for final closure of an underground dump, whereas AECL thought that goal could be achieved in a much shorter time period.

As with all good bureaucracies, NWMO is taking out a nice long insurance policy on its own survival as an organizational entity.

The so-called "Option 4 'Adaptive Phased Management' (APM)" discussed in the NWMO report is simply a dressed-up version of AECL's original nuclear waste burial program. Option 4 combines elements of the on-reactor site option, the centralized storage option and the underground burial option. In fact, nearly all the elements of APM can found in an October 1978 AECL publication, Management of Radioactive Fuel Wastes: The Canadian Disposal Program, J. Boulton (Editor), numbered AECL-6314. The Boulton report encompassed "Pre-disposal Technologies," including wet and dry storage at reactor sites, as well as the possibility of the need for a central storage facility. That report stated that "A central storage facility could be located at the site of a generating station or at a fuel management site which may also include immobilization and disposal facilities." These "pre-disposal" storage options would be needed for "several decades." The Boulton report goes on to describe the ultimate underground dump in grim detail.

As expected, the NWMO rejected the continued on-reactor-site storage of the waste. Expected, because such a decision could be fatal to the nuclear industry. It would be tantamount to a declaration that there is no solution to the nuclear waste problem (which at present happens to be true!). The industry's efforts to promote more nuclear energy, with the resulting production of more nuclear waste, would undoubtedly meet with more than a little skepticism from the Canadian public if the waste remained at the reactor sites indefinitely. So, NWMO's recommendations are quite in sync with the nuclear industry's current aggressive reactor marketing schemes.

As for other approaches to nuclear waste management, NWMO dismissed the promising option of transmuting nuclear waste to low-grade or even inert substances because it "...is not yet sufficiently advanced for implementation and long-term management of the residual materials would still be required." It cites a report from French nuclear authorities that "industrial implementation of transmutation cannot be seen until the years 2040-2050 at best." And yet, NWMO is perfectly willing to wait some three hundred years before a dubious underground repository is permanently closed.

On this very subject, NWMO simply ignored some of the best information given to it by its own consultants' discussion papers.

In NWMO Background Paper: 6.5 Technical Methods: Range of Potential Options for the Long-Term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, by Phil Richardson & Marion Hill, Enviros Consulting, it is stated that "It is recognized internationally that the possibility that P&T (partitioning and transmutation) could become a readily available and very attractive treatment option in several decades time, (and) could be a reason for choosing storage rather than disposal."

Damn good reason!

Furthermore, in NWMO Background Paper: 6-1 Technical Methods: Status of Reactor Site Storage Systems for Used Nuclear Fuel, by SENES Consultants Limited, it is stated that the dry storage facilities of irradiated fuel at Canada's nuclear power sites currently have a design life of 50 years and that "...the actual life of dry storage containers is thought to be 100 years or more."

Put two and two together, and you have a compelling case for continued on-site storage, with augmented security, coupled with some serious research and development into transmutation technologies, (which is being pursued in many countries around the world, but not in Canada).

The Canadian Nuclear Industry wants to sell, sell, sell more reactors, and it can't wait several decades for what could turn out to be a real scientific solution for the waste, as contrasted with the crude "out of sight-out of mind" option chosen by its Nuclear Waste Management Organization.

Among other liabilities, the Adaptive Phased Management Monstrosity proposed by the NWMO would put decades of continuous nuclear waste traffic on highways, rail lines, and even seaways - major Canadian transportation corridors; a terrorists' dream scenario!

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